The main complaints about the MCC are that it has disbursed only a small fraction of the funds appropriated to it by the Congress, and it has not yet produced any measurable results. These are not real problems.
They refl ect unrealistic expectations.
The biggest problem we see is risk aversion. Under pressure to prove it is not wasting taxpayer monies, the MCC has opted to use familiar techniques and partners, and to push for early results. These choices could ultimately doom the concept. Development is a messy process. Impatience is the chief enemy of effective development assistance. With highly visible domestic problems, such as our health care and fi nancial systems, it is especially unhelpful to expect developing countries to achieve quick and effi cient results.
The MCC has six features that make it special and worth reinforcing:
Rewarding good performance. This much-touted approach alone justifi es giving the MCC a chance to serve as a proof of concept.
• Focusing on low-income countries. As long as Congress continues to fund the MCC well below the $5 billion per year rate in President Bush's original proposal, this focus is sensible.
Using objective indicators to guide the selection process. While the objective indicators have limitations that require the use of subjective judgment, they are the most innovative feature of the MCC and are the principal driver of the "MCC effect."
Achieving a high degree of country ownership. The process of developing a compact proposal has set a new standard for developing a program that addresses the partner country's own priorities, has broad support, and enjoys the fi rm commitment of the government.
Having operational fl exibility. Congress has wisely chosen not to micromanage the MCC. This feature may be the most critical in making the MCC a successful experiment. Three sources of flexibility contribute to its effectiveness: lack of country and sector earmarks, authority to ignore barnacles (like the "Buy America" requirement and dozens of other provisions that have hobbled other foreign aid agencies), and the ability to commit its appropriated funds in future fi scal years-eliminating pressure to commit them prematurely to avoid losing them entirely.
Keeping staff small. Much of the MCC's potential value will come from having experts who can help countries propose compacts that have minimal "overhead" costs. This feature may be at risk. Because of the types of projects the MCC has opted to support, pressures to add accountants and other experts in monitoring and evaluation are likely to intensify.
The MCC has one operational constraint that is seriously impairing its effectiveness: the provision in the MCC's authorizing legislation that limits the MCC to having only one active compact with a single partner country. It is impossible to be "transformative" in any country within fi ve years. The MCC will fail if the 10-20 years in order to achieve a sustainable transformation. The one-compact-per-country rule forces the MCC into packaging together activities that do not fi t naturally, and to follow a stop-and-start pattern of activity. The ability to enter into concurrent compacts is the most important short-term fi x for the MCC.
There are fi ve less critical fi xes that President-elect Obama could also seek to make the MCC more effective:
Governance. Add at least three private sector members to the MCC Board of Directors, making the ex offi cio members non-voting members, letting the Board elect its own Chairman, and appointing a new CEO and senior vice presidents who are above partisan politics.
Innovation. Actively seek compacts with public sector partners below the central government level, and with nongovernmental partners. Experiment with budget support linked to exceptional progress in a government program. Experiment with grants to leverage foreign investment.
Indicators. Adopt a more sophisticated approach to selection so that having a score below the median is not given as much weight in considering compact eligibility for countries that have taken a large leap forward in overall performance.
Lower the limit on middle-income countries.
Assuming that the MCC's annual budget allocation returns to the $2 billion level or higher, remove the 25 percent limit on compact commitments to lower middle-income countries within each fi scal year.
Threshold program. Instead of splitting funding and management responsibility for the Threshold program between the MCC and USAID, combine the responsibilities either in USAID or the MCC. If USAID is to be responsible, Congress should appropriate
• additional funds to support it or give it a priority ahead of other activities. If the MCC is responsible, the threshold program should be restructured to make it more consistent with the philosophy of the agency by funding activities that help good performers prepare to implement compacts instead of activities that help poor performers achieve better indicator scores.
Finally, there are two steps that Presiden-elect Obama could take to signal that he intends to utilize the MCC to its full potential:
A broader mandate. Until the 1990s, USAID gave a high priority to promoting economic growth in its assistance activities (grants and loans, for budget/ balance of payments support as well as project support). Currently there is no U.S. Government agency with the capacity to design and manage effective economic growth activities. In the context of moving MCC's budget allocation toward the $5 billion level in the original proposal, a case might be made for broadening the MCC's mandate to support economic growth activities in low-income countries and lower middle-income countries even when they do
• not qualify for a compact. This step would acknowledge that economic stagnation can be a major obstacle to good performance against the MCC's three core values. It would include authority to make loans and equity investments as well as grants. Operations along these lines would be distinct from what the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) does for two reasons. First, the MCC would only undertake these operations in countries that are good performers or are making signifi cant progress, while OPIC would continue to support sound projects by American investors without a direct link to country performance. Second, the MCC would have a larger "toolkit" that it could use innovatively, while OPIC would continue to operate with its limited set of tools. We noted in our earlier assessment that the private sector members were added when the Congress reworked the authorizing legislation submitted by the President. 2 The mix of government offi cials and private sector representatives seemed reasonable at the time. However, the two seats to be fi lled by nominees from the House leaders remained vacant due to uncompromising positions by the opposing parties, and
were not fi lled until June 2007. The impasse over fi lling these seats was part of the MCC's rough start.
On the positive side, the MCC from the beginning committed itself to a high standard of transparency.
Management and staffi ng
Several management and staffi ng mistakes contributed materially to the MCC's rocky start. There are two sides to every story, but we have not found anyone who laments the departure of Paul Applegarth.
He seems to have been too much of a micromanager, and he certainly failed to establish good relations with key members of the Congress on both sides of the aisle and their staff members.
Quite a few of the initial hires for the MCC's staff turned out to be square pegs in round holes, but it appears that quite a few of these were more or less imposed on Applegarth by the White House personnel offi ce. A number of initial hires came out of the fi nancial sector with little experience in programs to reduce poverty through economic growth. This limitation was compounded by a tendency to ignore or be unaware of the enormous expertise in the NGO sector and in USAID. As a result, false steps committed by the MCC were reported quickly to some key staff members in the Congress upon whose support the MCC was critically dependent.
Lawyers hired at the beginning were allowed to draft compacts that looked more like private sector contracts, creating a serious public relations problem in the partner countries, while establishing procedures that delayed implementation by requiring frequent Washington approvals. MCC staff members also initiated discussions with offi cials in partner countries without adequately consulting with USAID fi eld missions, which got the MCC off on the wrong foot with this important agency. Some MCC staff reported that they were actively discouraged from consulting with USAID.
As strange as it seems now, the fi rst managers of the MCC believed that they could get the program up and running with a staff of no more than 100 members.
The ceiling was moved up to 200 during the second year, and now stands at 300.
Funding
The original proposal by President Bush was to ramp up to a funding level of $5 billion per year within three 
Indicators and country selection
The MCC's greatest success in its early years was in creating an objective process for determining counAs strange as it seems now, the fi rst managers of the MCC believed that they could get the program up and running with a staff of no more than 100 members. Size. To achieve the objective of being "transformative," compacts were expected to be relatively large.
The average size for the fi rst four was $178 million.
The countries involved were relatively small, so these were clearly large commitments, Monitoring and evaluation. President Bush placed considerable emphasis on achieving "measurable results"
with the MCC. As a result, the MCC has made a considerable effort to include a state-of-the-art monitoring and evaluation system into every compact. No other donor makes its economic rate of return (ERR) analysis as detailed and freely-available as the MCC. This is commendable on its own, and presents an interesting challenge to other donor organizations. Nevertheless, the state of the art in measuring results is still fairly primitive. We worry that the MCC approach might backfire by establishing targets that will not be achieved even when the programs are successful from a holistic perspective.
Threshold programs
The legislation creating the MCC authorized "thresh- 
Governance and staffi ng
Apart from the resignation of the MCC's first CEO provide greater assurance to American taxpayers at the cost of short-circuiting, and perhaps weakening, the standard government procedures that will be needed over the long run if the country is to progress.
Expecting to "transform" low-income countries with poor records of economic growth with a fi ve-year compact is simply delusional.
Funding
The funding diffi culties experienced by the MCC in its fi rst two years have continued up to the present time.
As shown in Table 2 
Indicators and country selection
The MCC Board reviews candidate countries every 
Compacts signed
As of the end of FY2008, 18 compacts had been To address the problem of measurement, the MCC states that its approach is to seek indicators that meet eight criteria:
Are produced by an independent third party;
Draw on objective and high-quality data using a rigorous methodology;
Are publicly available;
Have broad country coverage;
Are comparable across countries;
Are clearly linked to economic growth and poverty reduction;
Are amenable to policy action within a two to three year horizon; and, Are broadly consistent from one year to the next.
Today, the MCC is using 17 indicators for measuring country performance. In general, the indicators have met broad approval in the donor community. As discussed below, they are not perfect, but no other available approach to objective measurement seems likely to offer superior results.
The Despite the evident success of the MCC in using objective indicators to guide eligibility for compacts, they suffer from at least four signifi cant limitations:
The majority of the measures used to assess performance are available only with a time lag. In some cases, this may be several years. Some of the organizations from which ratings are collected have reduced the gap between data collection and • dissemination. Nevertheless, much of this gap is inherent, and not susceptible to elimination. For indicators with a long lag, current conditions in the country may differ signifi cantly, or even dramatically, from those measured by the objective indicators. A change in government, as in Nicaragua or Bolivia, is frequently the source of a change in actual conditions.
The MCC is operating in a "bad neighborhood." It is primarily assisting low-income countries. These countries are poor because they have not grown in previous decades, or because (such as in Uganda or Nicaragua or Ghana or Tanzania) they went through a period of catastrophic decline, usually because of bad leadership or civil confl ict, or both. While the MCC assists only the "best performing" countries in this group, the assisted countries might be better classifi ed as the "least bad" among all developing countries. Nearly all low-income countries have weak institutions, including limited administrative capacity by the national government, a weak or cor- Even the best-performing candidate country is likely to be vulnerable to deterioration-sometimes slow, but sometimes rapid-in a particular area of performance that could cause the MCC to regret having signed a compact. Mutual fund prospectuses warn that "past results are no guarantee of future performance." Even stronger caveats are in order when the MCC deems a country to be eligible for a compact. Setbacks are an inevitable consequence of working in a bad neighborhood.
Measuring corruption is especially problematic. The MCC requires countries to rank above the median on the corruption indicator to be eligible for compacts. The corruption indicator used by the MCC is probably "state of the art." It draws upon heroic efforts by the World Bank Institute to identify and measure the quality of governance, using six different dimensions, including corruption. Nevertheless, there are two problems. First, the state of the art remains primitive. Second, corruption is not one thing, but many things. How does one weigh the various elements perceived by people, such as a corrupt judiciary, election fraud, bribes paid to a policeman or a government official, favoritism in awarding of government contracts, and nepotism in hiring?
The differences in interpretation about corruption between one country and another, or between one perspective and another, has produced a cottage industry, often based on anecdotes, of which countries in the world are the most corrupt. Kenya and the Philippines rank among the most corrupt in the world according to some international indices, such as that of the World Economic Forum (WEF). Nevertheless, neither one was ranked by the World Bank Institute as below the median for low-income countries in the FY 2008 rankings. This refl ects two
• •
problems: the inherent diffi culty of identifying an ideal measure of corruption, and differences in the audience for which the indicator is targeted. In the case of the WEF, the target audience is the international investment community, which is concerned about a subset of all corruption.
In sum, the MCC's approach to measuring country performance is as comprehensive and objective as one could hope for with the current techniques for measuring such things. Nevertheless, the process of selecting countries for compacts still involves a substantial degree of subjective judgment, both because of imperfections in measurement and because of the volatility of country performance over time.
Country selection
Initially, the MCC was limited to assisting low-income another 28 LMICs were qualifi ed for partnership with the MCC. Thus, in principle, the MCC has a universe of 95 countries from which to choose the best performers. 4 Given that the MCC has been able to conclude compacts with an average of 4.5 countries per year during its fi rst four years of operation, it would appear that the selection process is as easy as picking cherries. In practice, the lack of continuity of country performance identifi ed in the previous section means that today's good performer may be a poor performer tomorrow.
Of the 18 compacts signed so far, 14 have been with
LICs, and four with LMICs. Table 4 shows the recipients and the amounts of each by fi scal year. Also indicated in Table 4 Judging by the 18 compacts signed so far, the MCC has a strong preference for small countries. 
Compact design
The MCC has adopted a strongly country-centered approach to compact design. Many bilateral donor agencies do their own diagnoses of critical problems in countries they want to help ("needs assessments"), and then try to convince the government to support projects addressing these problems. Some donors, notably certain U.N. agencies, tend toward the opposite extreme of supporting whatever project the government of the moment proposes. The MCC takes a different and arguably better approach. Like most other donors, it has decided that the national government is the proper channel for its programs. Unlike other donors, however, the MCC has insisted on a national dialogue on priorities. This has led in most cases to a very public process, where extensive discussion of alternatives and approaches has taken place. In the three Central American countries visited for this study, taxi drivers and other ordinary people were familiar with the MCC compact and its progress (or lack thereof).
Still, the government in power determines the actual proposal to be submitted to the MCC, and the public discussion results in so many alternative concepts and proposals that the government has substantial leeway in the specifi c proposal it puts forward to the MCC. In With these factors operating, one consequence of having a compact seems to be a reduced incentive for meeting the MCC criteria.
Implementation of the MCC concept
Seven aspects of implementation are discussed in the following sections: organizational structure and staffi ng, compact implementation, sector priorities, partnerships with NGOs and businesses, relationship with USAID, relationship with other donors, and monitoring and evaluation.
Organizational structure and staffi ng
The MCC has chosen a very lean organizational structure. With a total staff of less than 300, it administers ongoing grants of about $5 billion. This represents more than $15 million per employee, which is probably five times that of the average employee of USAID.
Still, there is no easy way to compare fi nancial man- Honduras. This compact was primarily an infrastructure activity, intended to improve the main highway connecting much of Honduras (as well as El Salvador and Nicaragua) with the region's best Atlantic port.
This highway was expected to promote significant increases in non-traditional exports-particularly winter fruits and vegetables for the U.S. market-from all three countries. Weight-control stations along the highway and assured funding for highway maintenance were also expected to guarantee that the highway would continue to play this key role.
More than three years into the compact, however, the first kilometer of asphalt had yet to be laid.
Implementation was delayed for nearly a year by a new government that took offi ce a few months after the signing of the compact, which demanded wholesale changes in compact implementation. Nicaragua. This compact, too, was focused primarily on infrastructure. It included the upgrading of a major highway link with Honduras, as well as improvements in secondary and farm-to-market roads.
Improvements in property registration and property rights were also funded, along with farm productivity improvements.
As in Honduras, a change in government complicated the implementation of the compact. Remarkably, despite the new government's hostility to the United States, it has embraced the compact and generally advanced its implementation. Numerous frictions have arisen, however, over such matters as international bidding for contracts rather than using Nicaraguan 
Sector priorities
One early criticism of the MCC centered on its emphasis on infrastructure projects and its apparent neglect of social sectors and the poor. This emphasis mainly refl ects the priorities of the MCC's partner countries and the trend among donor agencies during the past two decades to make infrastructure fi nancing a low priority. Nevertheless, the MCC's sector focus has evolved over time. While agriculture and infrastructure were the clear priorities at the outset, and still account for more than half of all MCC funding, attention to other sectors has grown in more recent compacts. Table 7 shows the sectoral distribution of MCC funding for the fi rst 18 compacts. As indicated by the 
Partnerships with NGOs and businesses
The MCC appears to have been successful in mobi- The MCC has taken a more rigorous approach to monitoring and evaluation than other donors, requiring each partner country to prepare an Economic Rate of Return analysis, along with performance benchmarks.
easily be capable of mobilizing $200-500 million of private sector funding. This could multiply the impact of a compact on a country's infrastructure base.
Relationship with USAID
Initially, the MCC gave the impression that it believed it was smarter than traditional donors, and therefore had little to learn from them. Now the MCC seems to appreciate that development assistance is a highrisk, low-gain business, and value the knowledge and wisdom in the broad development community. For example, since the departure of Paul Applegarth, the MCC appears to have become a better partner with USAID. There is still considerable competition, but there is more shared interest than was evident earlier.
"Scaling up" from USAID pilot activities was evident in Ghana and Honduras-two of the four compact countries visited by the authors.
The tension that remains between USAID and MCC is primarily at the country level. Some USAID missions have seen cuts in funding allocations for their country programs as a direct result of a compact being signed.
It is widely understood that OMB has pressed for cuts in USAID funding for countries with compacts. State and USAID planners with broad responsibilities for allocating funds also tend to see overall U.S. government funding for a country as an important variable.
When the MCC allocates a large sum for a country, then funding initially allocated for other U.S. government agencies can be shifted to other priorities. So some degree of confl ict between USAID and MCC is almost inevitable.
In proposing the MCC, the Bush administration gave assurances that MCC funding would be additional, not a substitute for other forms of USG assistance.
In the aggregate, U.S. bilateral assistance has grown rapidly over the past fi ve years, so it is hard to see any substitution. But the shift in U.S. aid priorities-heavily toward Iraq/Afghanistan and HIV/AIDS-has meant that some longstanding USAID activities have become "residual categories," steadily drained to fund preferred activities. In particular, USAID programs targeting economic growth have been signifi cantly reduced.
This, together with a sharp reduction in the number of economists on USAID staff, has left that agency with a diminished capacity to promote economic growth in countries not receiving MCC compacts.
Relationship with other donors
The MCC has not given a high priority to coordination with other donors, despite its role as one of the principal donors in most compact countries. In part, this is due to the MCC's lean presence in the country. 
Monitoring and evaluation
The MCC has taken a more rigorous approach to monitoring and evaluation than other donors. In particular, 
Threshold programs
The MCC has committed some $360 million to "threshold programs," nearly all managed by USAID. A second vision is that threshold programs should address a particular "target of opportunity" that will help a country to qualify for a compact eventually.
Threshold programs that focus on corruption would seem to fall into this category. There are many ways to Time will tell, but history is not on the MCC's side. 
More fl exibility
In our 2005 assessment, we warned that the projects funded under MCC compacts were not easily distinguished from the kinds of projects that have been supported by USAID and other donor agencies for years. A third restraint to be relaxed is the requirement that the MCC limit funding for lower middle-income countries to 25 percent of total funds appropriated for compacts. With the MCC's funding level shrinking, the case for suspending new operations in lower middleincome countries is compelling. This paper, however, is premised on a belief that President-elect Obama will decide to allocate more budget funds to the MCC.
In this event, the arbitrary 25 percent rule detracts from the MCC's effectiveness, especially given the lumpiness of the MCC's commitments. One of the realities of the development assistance business is that $100 million of aid to a lower middle-income country is likely to yield more economic growth and poverty reduction than $100 million of aid to a low-income country.
Scaling up
The In addition, a case can be made for establishing fi eld offi ces when eligible countries begin working on compact proposals instead of waiting until after compacts have been signed.
Dropping or transferring threshold programs
A surprising finding in our study is that the MCC's threshold programs seem to be working at cross-purposes with the compact program. In short, they are not rewarding "self-generated" performance. They are focused more on helping countries improve their ranking against the indicators.
Two alternatives deserve serious consideration. One is to require USAID to use its own resources when undertaking activities designed to help countries improve their rankings. If it makes sense from the perspective of broad U.S. foreign policy and development assistance objectives to undertake these activities, then USAID can re-allocate its existing resources to do so or Congress can appropriate more funds to USAID for these activities. This approach has the advantage of avoiding any impression that the MCC is anxious to give countries compacts. A further advantage, considering that the MCC's high-powered money is becoming scarcer, is freeing up resources for compacts with countries that are already performing well.
Another alternative is to discontinue the use of threshold programs per se. Instead give the MCC broad authority to make grants to countries that have 
Getting a broader mandate
While it seems to fl y in the face of political realities, 
Leveraging foreign investment
Not a single compact has used MCC funding to leverage funding from foreign investors. The potential for leveraging in the infrastructure sector is especially great, and the infrastructure sector has accounted for 38 percent of the MCC's committed funds. More than projects in any other sector, infrastructure projects are amenable to payments by benefi ciaries for some (or all) of the cost of the investment, although this varies with the type of infrastructure being supported.
The MCC could substantially increase its development impact by leveraging private capital in its infrastructure activities.
Keeping the best that already exists
The MCC has a number of exceptional features that should be kept in mind when considering what to do with the MCC in the coming years. It would be unfortunate if any of these features were lost or weakened.
Whenever possible, they should be strengthened. Our shortlist of these features includes:
No earmarks and no time limit on committing funds.
Rewarding good performance.
Focusing on low-income countries.
Using objective indicators to guide the selection of eligible countries.
Achieving a high degree of country ownership.
Supporting activities that will generate economic growth.
Keeping staff small. 
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Low-income countries and lower middle-income countries compete against other countries in their separate peer groups only.
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